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Summary: Thucydides criticises Nicias for being too partial to divination (7.50.4). It is 
suggested here through the examination of the linguistic nuances of θειασμός and the 
verb προσκείμενος, that Thucydides assessed him negatively primarily because he took 
the side of the army-seers. Yet, this criticism ought not to be blown out of proportion. 
Thucydides’ portrait differs significantly from Plutarch’s who describes Nicias as a diffi-
dent man easily gripped by fear and addicted to prophecies. Consequently, Thucydides’ 
criticism is a small parenthesis in his overall presentation of the Athenian general’s ca-
reer whose decisions were based on skill, rational criteria and experience (5.16.1). 
 
καὶ ὁ Νικίας (ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ 
προσκείμενος) οὐδ᾽ ἂν διαβουλεύσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη πρίν, ὡς οἱ μάντεις 
ἐξηγοῦντο, τρὶς ἐννέα ἡμέρας μεῖναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινηθείη 
(Thuc. 7.50.4). 
 
And Nicias (who was a bit too partial to theiasmos and the like), said he 
would not consider moving before they stayed still for three times 
nine days as the seers advised. 
 
In this often-cited passage, Thucydides is clearly somewhat critical of Ni-
cias. The purpose of this note is to assess the nuances of his reproach by 
examining the broader context of the passage and the connection be-
tween theiasmos and the verb πρόσκειμαι. It will be argued that Nicias is 
not criticized because of his personal theological beliefs but because of 
his softness towards the seers, the ones who undertook to interpret the 
divine will. 
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NARRATIVE CONTEXT 
 
The context is the highly dramatic situation of the Athenians after they 
suffered a major defeat before Syracuse. The generals have just taken the 
decision to withdraw and even Nicias, who on a previous occasion had 
expressed doubts about the wisdom of open departure, now agreed. 
A few words ought to be said about Nicias’ initial reluctance to with-
draw openly. His reasoning was that when a besieging army decides to 
withdraw, it inevitably sends messages of weakness to the enemy and 
may invite pursuit. Thucydides writes: 
 
Nicias, without denying the bad state of their affairs, was unwilling to 
avow their weakness (ἀσθενῆ ἀποδεικνύναι), or to have it reported to 
the enemy that the Athenians in full council were openly voting for 
retreat; for in that case they would be much less likely to effect it 
when they wanted without discovery (7.48.1; trans. Crawley). 
 
The historian additionally mentions that Nicias had accurate infor-
mation that the Syracusans were running out of money and would capit-
ulate soon (7.48.2). The generals’ decision to hold out a bit longer was 
thus reasonable; however, as time went by and no offers of Syracusan 
surrender came forth, and as the condition of the Athenian army kept 
deteriorating, the generals unanimously made up their minds to depart 
in secrecy.  
This much about the context. Then, Thucydides recites, something 
entirely unexpected occurred: “just as [the Athenians] were ready to sail 
the moon eclipsed; for it happened (ἐτύγχανεν) to be full (7.50.4; italics 
mine).” The incident of the eclipse is presented dramatically by the his-
torian, as if it expressed an intrusion of the incalculable into the rational 
plans of man, a stroke of bad luck at a moment when escape still seemed 
possible. This lost opportunity has been amply pointed out by Hans Peter 
Stahl, Timothy Rood and others.1 To make things worse, the eclipse was 
viewed as ominous by the seers who accompanied the expedition and 
 
1 As shown by Stahl 2003: 218-19.  Rood 1998: 176 notes that ‘the Athenian defeat could 
have been averted’ had it not been for the delay after the eclipse. 
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they advised that the army ought to stay immobile for 27 days. This ad-
vice must have been made in public because Thucydides writes that the 
soldiers were urging (ἐκέλευον) the generals to heed these warnings. 
Next, comes the crucial passage where Thucydides remarks that Nicias 
was “a bit too partial to theiasmos and the like” and that he refused to 
move (7.50.4). In other words, Nicias agreed with the seers and the histo-
rian seems to be critical of this fact. 
Plutarch took a more extreme view of the same event almost five cen-
turies later when presenting his own version of Nicias’ character. The 
latter’s portrait does not match that of Thucydides since it clearly attrib-
utes the failure of the entire expedition to Nicias. 
PLUTARCH’S DESCRIPTION OF NICIAS’   
REACTION TO THE ECLIPSE 
 
Plutarch’s account of the eclipse contains details which are not found in 
Thucydides and which may have been picked up from later authors who 
were far more distant from the events of 415 than Thucydides. 2 As time 
went by, reality may have fused with legend and interpretation. Plutarch 
writes: 
 
But just as everything was prepared for this and none of the enemy 
was on the watch, since they did not expect the move at all, there 
came an eclipse of the moon by night. This was a great terror to Nicias 
and all those who were ignorant or superstitious (δεισιδαιμονίας) 
enough to quake at such a sight. The obscuration of the sun towards 
the end of the month was already understood, even by the common 
folk, as caused somehow or other by the moon; but what it was that 
the moon encountered, and how, being at the full, she should on a 
sudden lose her light and emit all sorts of colours, this was no easy 
thing to comprehend. Men thought it uncanny, – a sign sent from God 
in advance of diverse great calamities (Plu. Nic. 23.1; Perrin). 
 
 
2 For a critical assessment of N.’s portrait and its divergence from that of Thuc. see 
Nikolaidis 1988: 328-29. 
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Plutarch sketches a man who was not only superstitious but totally ter-
rified as were also his men. This interpretation goes far beyond what 
Thucydides writes since the Athenian historian makes no mention of 
fear. 3 Moreover, the latter’s criticism is mitigated by the small particle 
‘somewhat’ (τὶ), as first noted in 1975 by Stewart Irwin Oost, who went 
so far as to suggest that the phrasing presupposes that Thucydides ac-
cepted as reasonable “a degree of devotion to theiasmos and the like.”4 
Another important difference between Thucydides and Plutarch is 
that the latter contrasts the alleged superstition of Nicias with the en-
lightened attitude of Pericles. In order fully to understand this compari-
son we must look at both biographies of Plutarch, his Pericles and his Ni-
cias, and make a synthesis of his thoughts about enlightened attitudes 
and superstitious ones.  
 In his Pericles, Plutarch writes:  
 
These were not the only advantages Pericles had of his association 
with Anaxagoras. It appears that he was also lifted by him above su-
perstition (δυσειδαιμονίας δοκεῖ γενέσθαι καθυπέρθερος), that feeling 
which is produced by amazement at what happens in regions above 
us” (Plu. Per. 6; trans. Perrin). 
 
Anaxagoras appears also in the Nicias in the context of the moon eclipse 
which supposedly had terrified Nicias. 
 
The fist man to put in writing the clearest and boldest of all doctrines 
about the changing phases of the moon was Anaxagoras. But he was 
no ancient authority, nor was his doctrine in high repute. It was still 
under a seal of secrecy, and made its way slowly among a few only, 
who received it with a certain caution rather with implicit confidence 
… Anaxagoras was with difficulty rescued from imprisonment by Per-
icles … (Plu. Nic. 23.2-3; trans. Perrin). 
 
Plutarch was obviously impressed by Anaxagoras’ scientifically based 
doctrines and used them as a criterion to judge the level of rationalism 
 
3 Nikolaidis 1988: 328-29; Pelling 1992; 1999. 
4 Oost 1975: 192. 
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of statesmen; and he thought of Pericles as a very progressive and ra-
tional leader who was not only a fan of Anaxagoras but saved him from 
imprisonment. By contrast, he considered Nicias a superstitious man 
who was gripped by terror at the occurrence of irregular (but still natu-
ral) phenomena which he did not quite grasp. This portrayal of Nicias is 
not evident in Thucydides’ work and the reasons will be explained below. 
NICIAS AS A RATIONAL PLANNER AND STRATEGIST 
 
Contrary to Plutarch, Thucydides presents Nicias as an excellent general, 
one of the best of his times (Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου, πλεῖστα τῶν τότε εὖ 
φερόμενος ἐν στρατηγίαις, 5.16.1). He is also presented as an utterly log-
ical planner whose strategic choices were based on calculation and rea-
son.  For example, when Nicias delivers his two speeches against the Si-
cilian Expedition before the Athenian assembly in 415, he does not once 
evoke religious omens or the gods.5 On the contrary, it is others who turn 
to prophecies (θειάσαντες, 8.1) predicting success for the expedition and 
it is they who discard Nicias’ warnings. Conclusion: if Thucydides wanted 
to present Nicias as superstitious, he would certainly have attributed to 
him some religious arguments in his two speeches against the expedi-
tion. 
In his first speech Nicias makes the following three arguments which 
are solely based on reason: 
 
• The city profits most by foresight (προνοίᾳ δὲ πλεῖστα, 6.13). 
• He says that he wishes to leave as little as possible to chance 
(ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδούς, 6.23.3). 
• He claims that decisions ought to be based on hard facts and not 
on matters that are invisible and lie in the future (ἀφανῶν καὶ 
μελλόντων, 6.9.3). 
 
5 N. speaks about the ill-will of the gods in his last speech (7.77-78), and this has been 
assessed as a theological statement inappropriate to the occasion (Hornblower 2008: 
716). But at this point, the Athenians have already been defeated and N. needs to 
reassure them that the worse is already behind them by giving hope; divine justice 
is the last tool a general has at his disposal to build morale. 
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In his second speech, he likewise uses reason as the foundation for his 
arguments. By now, he has realised that the people of Athens are keen 
on the expedition and attempts to dissuade them by presenting his cal-
culations of the huge cost which the supplies will entail. This assessment 
serves the dual purpose of (hopefully) deterring the Athenians from vot-
ing in favour of the expedition, and of providing insurance against fail-
ure, in case the expedition is undertaken. The author later shows that 
these calculations were exact, and that the army was well prepared for a 
full siege of Syracuse.6 It ought to be added that Nicias did not underes-
timate the force of accident since, in his first speech, he states that an 
enterprise as far away as Sicily involves risks and dangers which could 
not be entirely calculated or controlled (6.20).  
Coming now to the episodes of the expedition, Nicias and Lamachus 
remained in charge after the recall of Alcibiades but Thucydides focuses 
mostly on Nicias. A fact (which many modern historians pass over hast-
ily) is that he planned a very successful siege of Syracuse and was on the 
verge of taking it by executing a speedy assault and by employing bold 
tactics of surprise. It is rarely emphasised that the enemy was at the 
point of capitulation when Gylippus arrived, and that the Syracusans had 
begun negotiations with Nicias concerning the terms of their surrender 
(6.104.4).  The portrait which Thucydides paints is that of a skilled and 
experienced general who calculated the situation with precision and 
who acted with exceptional speed. 
That Gylippus and the Corinthians arrived at the exact moment when 
Syracuse was about to be taken is presented as a fatal coincidence. How-
ever, some historians claim that it was Nicias’ fault because he failed to 
foresee the arrival of the enemy, especially since Gylippus’ ships had 
been spied at sea. For example, John H. Finley goes so far as to state that 
Nicias made “his second although not the last of his famous mistakes” 
 
6 Stahl 2003: 173-91. 
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when he failed to send a dispatch to intercept the nineteen Peloponne-
sian ships of Gylippus.7 Pace Finley and other historians, a careful exam-
ination of Thucydides’ text suggests that the situation was uncertain in 
many respects. How could Nicias have guessed that Gylippus was about 
to invade the Athenian contingent since Gylippus was himself unsure 
about which course of action to follow? The author explicitly says that 
he had given up on Sicily: 
 
Gylippus abandoned all hope of Sicily, and wishing to save Italy, rap-
idly crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum with the Corinthian, Pythen, 
two Laconian, and two Corinthian vessels, leaving the Corinthians to 
follow him after manning, in addition to their own ten, two Leucadian 
and two Ambraciot ships (6.104.1; trans. Crawley) 
 
A key passage follows: 
 
Nicias heard of his [Gylippus’] approach, but, like the Thurians, des-
pised the scanty number of his ships (ὑπερεῖδε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεῶν), 
and set down piracy as the only probable object of the voyage, and so 
took no precautions for the present (6.104. 3; trans. Crawley). 
 
Given the fact that the reader is made aware that Gylippus toured Italy 
with only a few accompanying vessels and no definite purpose, Nicias’ 
misperception seems justified (why else would Thucydides have pro-
vided such detail and why would he have mentioned that the Thurians 
made the same mistake unless he wanted to explain Nicias’ mistake)? 
Historians have judged the Athenian general from the point of view of 
the end-result without assessing what information he had at his disposal 
at the time. It seems preferable to conjecture that Thucydides attributes 
 
7 Finley 1963: 233-34. See also Westlake 1941: 58-65; Edmunds 1975: 117; Kallet 2001: 
157-58; Kagan 2009: 199; Gribble 1999: 82; the latter speaks of the timorous prevari-
cation of N. More recently: Tompkins 2017: 100-11; Nichols 2017: 470. Note that many 
of the above scholars adopt Demosthenes' view that Nicias procrastinated (7.42.3) 
but this judgment is explicitly attributed to D. by Thuc. both at the beginning and 
the end of the paragraph and cannot be taken as an objective assessment of the sit-
uation by the author. For bibl. see Hornblower 2008: 622-23. 
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Nicias’ mistake to an accident, namely that just a few ships were reported 
to him. 
In short, Gylippus’ appearance was indeed unexpected since he ar-
rived at the exact point of time when the circumvallation wall was al-
most (but not entirely) complete, and Syracuse was about to be taken. As 
already mentioned, the author presents the arrival as a bad coincidence: 
“it so happened” (ἔτυχε 7.2.4). Stahl has poignantly argued that this co-
incidence tipped the scales of victor and defeated: had Gylippus arrived 
just a few days later, Syracuse would have been in the hands of the Athe-
nians.8 Thucydides, then, presents Nicias’ operation not only as rational 
but well executed and speedy (διὰ τάχους 6.98.2) confirming this fact by 
citing Syracusan thoughts: ‘they [i. e. the Syracusans] were amazed at the 
speedy pace of the work (ἔκπληξιν παρέσχον τῷ τάχει τῆς οἰκοδομίας, 
6.98.2). Finally, the historian describes how efficiently the Athenians cut-
off the water supplies of the Syracusans and how subsequently the Athe-
nian fleet sailed into the harbour once they felt secure in doing so. Every-
thing had gone as Nicias planned: he had brought the Syracusans very 
close to utter danger (7.2.4). 
The point of the above discussion is to make clear that Thucydidean 
Nicias is presented as a rational general and tactician and that he has no 
relation to Plutarch’s fearful and superstitious character.  Given this, we 
must consider again what the theiasmos of Nicias consisted in. 
THE NUANCES OF ΘΕΙΑΣΜΟΣ  AND ΠΡΟΣΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ  
 
The exact meaning of theiasmos is difficult to determine. Thomas Hobbes 
in his 17th-century translation of Thucydides renders it as “superstition” 
and this meaning is adopted by LSJ, although frenzy is also given as an 
alternative.9 Superstition is clearly a mistake, as was noted already by K.J. 
Dover in Historical Commentary of Thucydides (although this realisation did 
not stop the great scholar from labelling Nicias as unenlightened: “an 
 
8 Stahl 2003: 91. 
9 Hobbes 1989: 474. 
A NOTE ON THE THEIASMOS OF NICIAS IN THUCYDIDES  9 
educated man in such a position [as Nicias] should have paid less atten-
tion to the seers”).10 Dover adopts Plutarch’s opinion of Nicias despite his 
admission that theiasmos cannot be translated as superstition. 
A more common rendition of theiasmos is divination, thus given in the 
older translations by Richard Crawley and Benjamin Jowett. Likewise, Si-
mon Hornblower translates it as divination in his Commentary on Thucyd-
ides: 
 
Nicias, who was rather excessively given to divination and that kind 
of thing (ἄγαν τὶ ... θειασμῷ προσκείμενος), said that he would not con-
sider moving before the time prescribed by the manteis had passed” 
(7.50.4).11  
 
Slightly different is the Modern Greek translation by the early twentieth 
century Greek statesman, Eleutherios Venizelos, who translates it as 
omens “οἰωνοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ...” This is an imprecise rendition, but it 
is evocative of the fact that the eclipse was perceived as a bad omen. 
The slight variation in the translations illustrates the opaqueness of 
the nuances of theiasmos and hence the puzzle concerning the nature of 
the historian’s criticism. What exactly was Thucydides annoyed about? 
After all, divination in battle was a standard practice to which the histo-
rian himself must have been subjected many times.12 
LSJ cites the possibility that theiasmos designates a particular type of 
prophecy related to frenzy or ecstatic behaviour, but neither meaning is 
supported by Thucydides’ text since it is hard to imagine that the seers 
in the Athenian army were frantic, or in a state of ecstasy, when they 
gave their interpretation of the moon eclipse. Finally, Dionysius of Hali-
carnassus speaks of women prophets who predicted catastrophes.13 This 
gender-specific frenzy cannot possibly apply to the situation in Sicily. 
 
10 Gomme, Andrewes & Dover 1970: 429. 
11 Hornblower 2008: 642. 
12 For the examination of the entrails and other portents by seers (as attested in an-
cient authors) see Burkert 1985: 113; Flower 2008: 154-56. The word theiasmos is not 
used in this connection. 
13 D.H. 7.68. 
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The question that needs to be asked next is whether theiasmos is re-
ferring to the institution of divination practiced before battle, or if it is 
just a derogatory name discrediting the habit of practitioners who pre-
dicted the future, thus claiming a precise understanding of the divine 
will. It is proposed here that it is the latter since theiasmos is referred to 
only once in the text and the participle θειάσαντες clearly points to hu-
man agents who are negatively assessed (8.1).  Possibly also τῷ τοιούτῳ 
alludes to the seers who shaped the opinion of the army after battle. 
Hornblower thinks otherwise, implying that Thucydides’ scepticism 
is applicable to the concept of prophecy in general. He correctly points 
out to a parallel passage about the plague where prophecies are referred 
to with contempt: “divinations, and so forth which they used and which 
were found equally futile (μαντείοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐχρήσαντο, πάντα 
ἀνωφελῆ ἦν (2.47.2; Crawley modified, italics mine). Hornblower con-
cludes that Thucydides’ negative judgment on Nicias, who was exces-
sively given to divination and “that kind of thing,” has been “long held 
back” in the narrative.14 However, the sentence which Hornblower cites 
clearly points to the people who utilised the oracles (ἐχρήσαντο) for their 
own purposes. The subject of ἐχρήσαντο is probably the manteis and sim-
ilar religious practitioners, and it is against them that the criticism of the 
historian is directed. 
There is a further aspect to consider: Nicias was not habitually sus-
ceptible to prophecies since when the oracle mongers predicted success 
in Sicily, he was clearly not on their side. After the disaster, the false pre-
dictions of the seers incited the anger of the Athenians: “… χρησμολόγοις 
τε καὶ μάντεσι καὶ ὁπόσοι τι τότε αὐτοὺς θειάσαντες ἐπήλπισαν ὡς 
λήψονται Σικελίαν (8.1).” Jowett sharply renders the nuances of the 
Greek in his translation: “reciters of oracles and soothsayers, and all 
other omen-mongers of the time (8.1).” 
In short, theiasmos does indeed mean divination, or better said, the 
divine side of a situation,15 but the context points also to agency, the 
seers who interpreted the divine will. If so, Thucydides is saying that Ni-
cias had the inclination to accept whatever the seers suggested, whereas 
 
14 Hornblower 2008: 642. 
15 Parker 2000: 299-314. I thank Prof. Parker for his elucidating remarks about theiasmos 
meaning the divine aspect of a situation in an oral communication. 
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he, namely the author (who had also been a general of the Athenian 
army), felt that it was not the job of the seers to make strategic decisions 
since this was the role of generals. Note that Plato attempts to correct 
this impression (perhaps intentionally addressing Thucydides’ criticism) 
in his Laches. There, Nicias is made to say that the soothsayer is obliged 
to diagnose the signs (ἐπεὶ μάντιν γε τὰ σημεῖα μόνον δεῖ γιγνώσκειν τῶν 
ἐσομένων,) but someone else (e.g., a general) will need to decide what is 
the best action-plan (Pl. Laches 195e-196a).16 In this manner, Plato reha-
bilitates the reputation of Nicias’ judgment. 
Returning now to Thucydides, the case becomes stronger if we con-
sider that the historian chooses the word προσκείμενος to describe the 
specific attachment of Nicias to theiasmos; because, as it will be argued 
subsequently, the verb connotes taking sides in an issue or siding with 
particular persons. 
According to LSJ, πρόσκειμαι has both a physical and metaphorical 
meaning. Literally, it means to be close to an object, as a stone lies next 
to another stone in a wall, or as when a man is in proximity of a door.  In 
the metaphorical sense, it means devotion or addiction, which is how the 
verb is often translated in connection with Nicias. And yet, another met-
aphorical meaning may be more precise: taking the sides of a person, or 
a group of persons, or even endorsing an idea. Herodotus, for example, 
writes that he prefers one version of a Scythian legend over others: 
“There is another story which I myself think the most likely” (ἔστι δὲ καὶ 
ἄλλος λόγος ἔχων ὧδε, τῷ μάλιστα λεγομένῳ αὐτὸς πρόσκειμαι (4.11). 
Alternatively, the verb may mean attachment to a particular human be-
ing. Again, Herodotus writes that the Spartan king Ariston had a friend 
to whom he was especially attached (ἦν οἱ φίλος τῶν Σπαρτιητέων ἀνήρ, 
τῷ προσέκειτο τῶν ἀστῶν μάλιστα ὁ Ἀρίστων (6.61.2). Another use which 
Thucydides makes of πρόσκειμαι is partisanship: 
  
It was for motives of personal ambition that most of them were fol-
lowing (προσέκειντο) this political preference that is most disastrous 
to oligarchies when they take over from democracies (8.89.3; Warner).  
 
16 In the same dialogue, Nicias makes a distinction between thoughtless fear (the in-
stinctual reaction to danger as experienced by animals or small children) and cour-
age, which entails knowledge (197b). 
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In this case, προσέκειντο means to take the side of one political party 
over another, although the author notes that the real motivation was 
satisfaction of personal ambitions. In another passage, Alcibiades tells 
the Spartans that he hopes not to be suspected of being politically and 
ideologically attached to the demos (διότι καὶ τῷ δήμῳ προσεκείμην 
μᾶλλον, 6.89.3). Once again, the verb designates a political/ideological 
preference and attachment to a group, in this case the demos.  At another 
place, Alcibiades is described as being close to Tissaphernes and of doing 
all he could to gain his favour: “So Alcibiades … was eagerly flattering 
Tissaphernes and was close to him” (προθύμως τὸν Τισσαφέρνην 
θεραπεύων προσέκειτο, 8.52).  On another occasion, when Alcibiades was 
in Sparta, he took the side of the Spartans and their allies against his own 
people, the Athenians, urging the Spartans to fortify Deceleia and not to 
relax the war with Athens (καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης προσκείμενος ἐδίδασκε τὴν 
Δεκέλειαν τειχίζειν καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι τὸν πόλεμον, 7.18). 
If we apply these nuances of προσέκειτο to the passage under discus-
sion, Thucydides is saying that Nicias – perhaps habitually – took the side 
of the manteis. On his part, the historian shows elsewhere that he had 
severe reservations about their character and considered them unrelia-
ble, self-seeking and capable of promoting their own agenda instead of 
the common good. Indeed, such people could inflict damage on the de-
mocracy.17 
MANTIS AND GENERAL 
 
Why might Nicias have taken the side of the manteis? This is an important 
question, and it will be proposed here that his choice was likely dictated 
by pragmatism rather than superstition or addiction to prophecy. 
The relationship between mantis and general was a sensitive one 
working best when the two did not disagree but formed a unified front 
with the purpose of building up the morale of the soldiers. The subject 
has been thoroughly explored by Michael Flower, who points out that 
when general and seer disagreed, the morale and indeed mental health 
 
17 Marinatos 1981: 51-52 cf. Thuc. 2.8.2, .21.3; Furley 2006: 415-38. 
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of the army could be endangered.18 There are even plenty of mythical 
paradigms in Greek literature reflecting the same, namely they describe 
the disastrous results that ensued from dissention: consider the conflict 
between Agamemnon and Calchas in Iliad; Teiresias and Oedipus in Oedi-
pus King; Calchas and Agamemnon in Euripides’ Iphigeneia in Aulis. In light 
of this information, Nicias’ decision to side with the seers may have been 
a rationally based choice with the aim of avoiding mutiny in his army – 
a mutiny which would have proven fatal to their survival.19 These prag-
matic considerations were surely understood by Thucydides;20 even so 
he seems to have wished that Nicias had, on this occasion at least, inter-
vened more forcefully and had not sided with the manteis. This taking of 
sides, I think, is what the historian criticises by ἄγαν τι προσκείμενος. 
Are we splitting hairs? Does it make much difference if theiasmos 
points to the agents of divination rather than the concept itself? It does 
matter, I believe, if our aim is to assess Thucydides’ portrait of Nicias. If 
the historian considered him an irrational man, then he certainly did not 
appreciate him as a general because military men must be capable of cal-
culating their strategies precisely and soberly. Indeed, Thucydides 
demonstrates in his narrative that Nicias recognized opportunities and 
assessed situations correctly during the Archidamian War when he prac-
tically had zero failures (5.16.1),21 whereas in Sicily he acted prudently 
taking his time to gather allies and supplies and acted suddenly by land-
ing near Syracuse in darkness and speedily capturing Epipolai. Moreover, 
the historian shows profound admiration of Nicias in a funerary epigram 
in which he praises the latter as a man of exceptional arete. This word 
surely does not solely refer to moral integrity but also military acuity and 
valour (7.86.5).22 True, Nicias’ partiality to the manteis was considered a 
weakness by the historian, but it was a tiny part of his overall positive 
 
18 Flower 2008: 156-58 and 16. 
19 Piccirilli 1997: 1-8. 
20 Greenwood 2017: 167, reasonably says that the failure of the Sicilian expedition may 
have been a result of pragmatic decisions. 
21 Geske 2005: 177-79. 
22 Adkins 1975: 379-92; Ossipova 2001: 113-18; Steinbock 2017: 109-70. But see Tompkins 
2017: 120-2. 
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presentation: we might call it a mere parenthesis, rather than a judgment 
long held back, as the authoritative commentator puts it.23 
  
 
23 Hornblower 2008: 642. 
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